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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTMI
LEONARD BATES,
Pla;n.tiff o.;n.d Appellant,
-vs.ODELL WALKER BURNS, and ODELL
WALKER BURNS, FARRELL BURNS,
and F'RANK D. BURN'S, doing business
as a copartnership in the name and style
of BURNS FEED AND SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defend(JJfl)tS and Respondents.

Case No.
8207

BRIEF ·OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPOND·E,NTS

NATURE OF T'HE CASE
This appeal arises out of an automobile accident
which occurred on October 9, 1952, at the intersection of
U. S. Highway 91, a through highway, and Utah Highway
114, also known as the Geneva Road and Third West
Street, in Pleasant Grove, Utah. Plaintiff had been
traveling in a generally north direction along U. S. Highway 114 and was driving a pick-up truck through the intersection to proceed north on Third West in Pleasant
Grove, Utah, when his pick-up truck wa'S struck by a coal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

truck driven by the defendants, which had been traveling
west upon U. S. Highway 91, towards Salt Lake City,
Utah. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict. The court reserved its
judgment and submittHd tlie case to the jury, who returned a verdict itemized as follows:
Physical injury, pain and suffering________ $
Medical Exp·enses --------------------------------------$ 214.50
Loss of earnings during recupera.tion ____ $1,000.00
·Permanent disability__________________________________ $4, 000.00
Pick-up truck ----------------------------------------------$ 565.00
Total ----------------------------- ____ -------------------$5,779 .'50
(R.171)

Thereafter, the court, p·ursuant to defendants' motion, set aside the verdict and entered a judgment of no
cause of action in favor of the defendants (R. 237-8) on
the grounds that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to cause the collision as a
matter of law.
The questions presented by this appeal are two-fold:
Whether the evidence sustains the court's finding that
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was a contributing cause of the accident and his resulting injuries,
and, in the event the court should see fit to reinstate the
verdict, should it be reinstated in view of the fact that
it is erroneous, the verdict being invalid and there
being no evidence or findings to sustain ·damages for loss
of earnings or permanent disability~
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ST·ATEMENT OF FACTS
The intersection where this accident occurred is
located south of Pleasant Grove in Utah County. It is
forrned by the crossing of U. S. Highway 91, which at
this point runs generally east and west, and a highway
extending generally north and south designated as Highway 114, or the Geneva Road south of the intersection
and Third West Street north of the intersection (S.ee
Exhibit A).
U. 8. Highway 91 is the preferred highway. There
are stop signs located on the northwest and southwest
corners of the intersection, so that cars entering the intersection from the Geneva R.oad or Third West Street are
obliged to stop before entering (Exhibit A).
Plaintiff was thoroughly conversant with the interseetion having made the same trip six days a week for
some time (R. 59). He testified that at times the
traffic along U. S. Highway 91 was very heavy. There is
evidence he had been required to wait as long as fifteen
minutes before entering and crossing the intersection.
On the day of the accident at about two o'clock P.M.,
the plaintiff, a man sixty-nine years of age (R. 83), was
driving his pickup north on the Geneva Road (R. 58-59)
on his way to the Jacob Fieed Mills of Pleasant Grove,
Utah, to get a load of feed for turkeys that he was raising.
The weather was clear and the pavement dry. He testified that as he reached the intersection he stopped at the
stop sign, remaining stopped for four or five minutes as
the traffic on Highway 91 was heavy. Then he started
across the intersection (R. 61) at a speed of five to six
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miles p·er hour (R. 62) . He testified on direct exalnination that he did not see defendants' truck until it was
"maybe 150 feet" away and speeded his pick-up truck up
a little "on the last end" to get through the intersection.
(R. 62) On cross-examination, the plaintiff estimated
that he was past the center of Highway 91 (R. 89) when
he first saw the defendants' coal truck 100 to 150 feet
away (R. 90). l-Ie denied ever making the statement (See
Defendants'Exhibit 1): "I did not see the truck or know
it was near until it hit me," although he admits that he
signed the statement (R. 93). He admitted that he may
have forgotten that he did not see the truck at all. (R.90)
The p·oint of impact was approximately 12·5 feet from the
stop sign where the plaintiff had stopped (Exhibit A). A
line drawn on Exhibit from the point where the stop sign
was located would indicate a vehicle approaching the intersection from the south would have been visible when 368
feet from the intersection, provided that trees and foliage on the south west corner of the intersection did not
obstruct the line of visibility.
·The plaintiff did not recall seeing Dr. Paul V. Christopherson, whom he knew, drive a car east toward the
intersection and turn south onto the Geneva Road while
plaintiff was stopped at the stop· sign (R. 88). Paul V.
Christopherson testified that he was personally acquainted with the plaintiff (R.. 103). Immediately prior to
the accident he had been traveling east on U. S. Highway
91 ·(R. 104). As he reached the intersection, he made a
a right hand turn onto Geneva Road (R. 104). As the
witness passed the plaintiff's truck, which was then
4
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stopped in the vicinity of the stop sign, he nodded to the
plaintiff, who did not return his salutation (R.. 105).
Plaintiff was looking to the west out of the window at
the time he was observed by the witness. As the witness
drove past him, the plaintiff started his pick-up truck
through the intersection. Apparently Dr. Chrisopherson
beca1ne apprehensive by reason of the inattention of the
plaintiff to traffic upon U. S. Highway 91, and watched
him in the rear view mirror as plaintiff proceeded into
the intersection (R. 106). He testified that he saw the
plaintiff's truck start through the intersection and proceed to a point about 6 to 10 feet north of the center
line where the collision occurred (R. 107). After the
collision, the witness returned to the scene of the accident. From his observations both before and after the
collision, the witness expressed the opinion that the
defendants' coal truck was not traveling fast (R. 114).
La Var Holdaway, plaintiff's witness, testified that he
was stopped at the stop sign at the northwest corner
of the intersection waiting for the coal truck to pass
at the time of the collision (R. 23). He saw plaintiff's
pick-up truck stopped across U. S. Highway 91 (R. 23).
He watched the pick-up move forward into the intersection ( R. 23). As plaintiff proceeded through the
intersection, he did not change his rrute of travel, stop, or
turn his vehicle at any time before the collision (R. 29-31).
It appeared to the witness that plaintiff did not see the
coal truck ( R. 29) .
La Var Holdaway testified further that he observed
the coal truck approaching at a normal rate of speed,
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at one time estimating the speed at 40 to 50 1niles per
hour and at another at 40. The plaintiff crossed in front
of the coal truck when it was 50 to 75 feet from the plaintiff's pickup (R. 30). The driver of the coal truck applied
the brakes and swerved toward the witness's car, almost
striking the front of the witness's car, in an effort to
avoid the collision (R. 30-31).
lone Garbin testified that she lived on the northwesrt corner of the intersection (R. 130). At the time of
the collision, she was standing in her kitchen door calling
her daughter and two grandchildren for lunch. F'rom
where she was standing she had a clear view of the intersection and first observed the plaintiff's pick-up truck
a.s it started across the high,vay (R. 131). The pick-up
p~roceeded very slowly across the intersection and neir.ther
stopped or turned or otherwise attempted to avoid the
collision (R.. 132). She also observed the coal truck and
saw the driver of that truck attempt to avoid the pick-up
and still not strike a car which was stopped at the stop
sign on the north side of the highway (R. 132). The witness testified 1that since the accident, the southwest
corner of the intersection has been re-graded and the
weeds on that corner removed to give drivers a hetter
view of approaching traffic (R. 133).
Mack Ostergaard testified that on October 9, 1952,
he was employed as a police officer for Linden City and
was called 'to the scene of this accident (R. 115). Upon
arriving at the scene, he first went to the plaintiff to see
if he could he of any assistance. Mr. Bates told him,
"I don't know what hit me." Odell Burns, driver of
6
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defendants' coal truck, told him, "I didn't have a chance.
He pulled right in fronrt of me." Mr. Burns estimated
his speed at 35 miles per hour just before the accident,
and said that he had tried to drive between the two cars,
the pick-up and the car parked on the north side of the
intersection, and had 'tried to avoid hitting either of
them (R. 117).
The police officer testified that since the accident
the area on the southwest corner of the intersection has
been graded to give better visibilirty of approaching
traffic (R. 118). The witness located the point of impact
by the debris on the highway as being on the north side of
U. S. Highway 91 and in the normal lane of traffic for
cars traveling north on Third West Street. He placed
an "(X)" on. Exhibit A where he belived the point of
impact to be (R. 119). From this point there were skid
marks extending back up Highway 91 for a distance of
22 feet, presun1ably laid down by the coal truck.
Odell Burns, the driver of the defendanfts' coal
truck and one of the defendants herein, testified he was
traveling west on U. s. Highway 91 at. a. speed of 35 miles
per hour (R. 138-140). When he was within approximately 100 feet of the intersection, he saw the pick-up
truck start across the highway from the south going
north (R. 169). He expected the pick-up to stop, but
honked his horn and turned slightly to the right. The
pick-up kept coming north without changing its speed,
turning or in any way changing its course. When it
became apparent that it was not going to yield the right
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of way, he applied the brakes and turned his truck to
the right (R. 139).
Mr. John Stewart, testified that he took the statement, defendant's. Exhibit 1, wherein the defendant said
that he did not see the truck or knew it was near until it
hit him. ·The statement was taken in the presence of Mrs.
Bates and was read by Mr. Bates before he signed it . .P_i_t
the time Mr.Stewart went out to s-ee Mr. Bates, Mr. ·stewart testified that he had no connection with either Mr.
Bates or the counsel for the defendant. Testifying out of
the presence of the jury, Mr. Stewart testified that he wa;s
employed by the Farmers Insurance Company at the
time. When the statement was taken he did not recall
whether or not Mr. Bates was insured with his company
but that his employer did not have any business connection, relationship or connection of any kind with the
Burns Feed Company, the partners in that company or
the attorneys for the defendants.
On the question of the injuries sustained, the only
evidence presented was the testimony of the plaintiff,
his wife, and his daughter and a stipulation between
the parties. They testified that the plaintiff had received
a cut on his head two and a half inches long ·(R. 35-68),
a lump on his forehead, and his right eye was swollen,
his knees were cut, and he had a sprained shoulder
(R. 27). It was stipulated rthat the plaintiff received
seven simple fractures of the ribs, and at the time of the
trial, the ribs had fully healed. No X-rays were produced. There was no medical testimony that plaintiff
sustained any permanent disability. The only evidence
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was that he was that he \vas forgetful (R. 39-53), and
that he cannot do the work now that he could do before
the accident (R. 40-54). He admitted that he had not
done heavy work before rthe accident.
Plaintiff clain1ed to have lost a number of turkeys in
the year 195·2 as a result of this accident. An examination of his testimony which appears in the record starting on page 75 will show that the evidence in this regard
is extremely speculative. Mr. Bates testified:
"Q. Now, your wife testified that you raised
quite a number of turkeys in 1952. How
many~

A.

Q.
A.

A.
Q.
A.

Well, I got 6,000 to start in with, but I
lost, oh-I marketed about 5,200.
5,200. That would be a loss of about 800.
Yes, sir-800.
MR. HANSON: 800.
11:R. STEWART: Pardon me. Now, in connection with your loss of turkeys, do you
know approximately how many of these 'Nere
lost after October 2, 1952 ~
No, I couldn't tell you.
I-I ave you some idea~
No, I haven't any idea.

* * *
MR. STEWART: Were any of the turkeys
in 1952 lost after October 9th of that year~
A. Oh, yes. Well, after O·ctober 9th, there
were several lost between then and the time
I marketed them, on the 1st of December.
Q. Would you have any idea approximately
how many were loS't ~

* * *
A.

Well, I should judge-you take later in the
9
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season, when your turkeys is about ready
for market, why you lose a few more than
you do earlier. I should judge maybe I
lost 200.

Q. Now was. the loss, a higher loss than ordinarily for that season of the year~
* * *
A. It all depends on the season. Now we had
quite a lot of storm in ·October of 19'52, and
November, and when the turkeys get heavy,
that is when you have quite a loss.
* * *
Q. Now as a result of your accident, can you
trace any of your losses to the fact that you
were incapable of looking after your turkeys
that year~
A.

Well, I wasn't able-as a general rule, I go
through my turkeys twice and three times a
day, and I watch them pretty close, and I
wasn't able to do it.
* * *
Q. What p~art of 1hat loss would you sayY
* * *
A. I should judge I lost about thirty-five per
cent more.
Q.

Thirty-five per cent more Y
* * *
MR. STEWART: What did you receive for
your turkeys that year~

A.

I got thirty-eight cents a pound, that was for
A's. Then the B's was three cents below that,
and the C's were two cents-and ten cents
below that.
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Q.

Now can you tell us of the 200 that you lost,
about what percentage were A's and what
were B's~

A.

I couldn't tell you that.

Q. You haven't any way to arrive at
A.

Q.

that~

Most of your turkeys, if your h-erd is in good
shape, they are pret' near all A ~turkeys.
·They will run about, around, oh pretty close
to eighty per cent, between seventy-five and
eighty per cent.
That is of your herd~

A. Herd.

Q. Now, of the 200, would there be some way to
guess at that, or estimate it~

* * *
A.

Well I should judge that there was, out of
that 200, there was anyway 150 of them A
turkeys.

Q.

That would leave you 50

A.

That would leave 50 turkeys for B's and
C's.

* * *
turkeys~

Q. Now, I'm trying to get at the 70 that you
lost, or thereabouts, as a result of your not
being able to be on the job.
MR. HANS:ON: We object to that as leading and suggestive, and repetitious, Your
Honor, he testified about the storms.
Apparently the man doesn't know. And
counsel keeps asking him the same question.
We object to it as repetitious."
Mr. Bates testified further in this regard that he
11
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had to hire additional help to raise his turkeys in
1953 because of his injuries. In the year 1952, he stated
lie made about $2,000.00 net, but that in 1953 he ran
more turkeys grossing $58,038.67 and netting $8,212.35,
It appeared that the plaintiff had made considerably more from the operation of his turkeys after the
accident than he had the yea.r before.
In his brief, plaintiff has presented his argument in
four points. ·The first three apear to be directed toward
tli·e p-roposition that the evidence did not sustain the
court's finding that plaintiff was guil5 of negligence as
a matter .of law. The last point appears to be directed
toward the entry of the verdict of the jury. We· will deal
with the argument under the following statements of
points:
STATE,MENT OF POIN'T·S
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
AND THA'T HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE COLLISION.

POINT II.
THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY WAS IMPROPER ON ITS FACE AND NO;T SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POIN·T I.
THE EVIDEN·CE SUSTAINS THE FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
AND THAT HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE COLLISION.

Much of the plaintiff's argument is dedicated to a
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discussion of whether the driver of the defendants' coal
truck was negligent. Without conceding that the driver
was negligent, we wish to point out that the verdict in this
case was set aside on the grounds that the plain tiff "was
negligent as a matter of lavv and, likewise, as a n1atter of
law, his negligence proximately contributed to produce
the accident and his own injury and damage." We will,
therefore, confine our argument to a discussion of the
plaintiff's own negligence.
The assertion is made that in reviewing the court's
action on this motion, v1e must review the evidence in its
most favorable light to the plaintiff. We do not controvert this proposition and will not, therefore, cite any
authorities on this point.
The evidence in this case is that the plaintiff was
"\Vell acquainted with the intersection which was on occasion very busy. Frequently, plaintiff had to wait a considerable time for traffic to clear before entering the
intersection. R.eference to Exhibit 1 will illustrate that
the stop sign is located a considerable distance south of
the intersection. At that point the plaintiff would have
had a view of traffic approaching the intersection on the
east for a distance of 368 feei, except that the foilage on
the southeast corner of the intersection may have blocked
his view. He testified that he looked both ways and he
could not see but what the highway was clear. There is
no evidence in the record tha:t he looked toward the east
again, the direction from which the coal truck came, until
after he had entered the intersection and crossed the
center line of U. S. Highway 91. The witness Paul
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Christopherson, testified that plaintiff was looking west
and continued to do so as he entered the intersection.
Had plaintiff looked to the east, he would have probably
seen the defendants' truck approaching, as La Var
Holdaway did as it was only 100 feet from the intersection at that time. If this were the case, plaintiff would
be guilty of negligence as a matter of law in entering
the intersection. If the truck were not within his range of
vision, which was somewhat greater than 368 feet, plaintiff had ample time to enter the intersection and drive
through the same safely before the coal truck traveling
from 35· to 50 miles per hour could have reached the
intersection, that is, had he p·roceeded at a reasonable
rate of speed. The evidence shows that he entered the

~~:er:;;~:=i~t:t: ~~:" ~·;:~~ ~~ ~~~~:~·~~~~~d:

speed of only 5 or 6 miles per hour.
The witness, La Var Holdaway, who was stopped
at the stop sign across the intersection testified that
at the time the plaintiff entered the inte:csection the witness could see the coal truck and was waiting for this
truck to pass. Plaintiff drove to the point of impact
without either slowing or increasing his sp·eed or varying
the course of his vehicle. It appeared to the witness and
the conclusion is warranted that the plaintiff did not see
the coal truck. The other eye witness, lone Garbin, testified the same. Th·e plaintiff himself told the investigating
police officer that, "I don't kno'v wha:t hit me." Plaintiff
~igned a statement to the effect, "I did not see the truck
or know it was near until it hit me."
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It therefore appears from the evidence that the
plaintiff drove through a busy intersection without looking in the direction from whence came the car that struck
him, either as he entered or proceeded through the intersection at the very slo'v speed of 5· to 6 miles per hour.
This accident could have been avoided at any time by
the plaintiff by one or more of the following actions. He
could have looked for approaching traffic from the east
before entering the intersection. Had he seen defendants' coal truck approaching, the plaintiff need only
have waited until the vehicle passed the intersection.
Not seeing the coal truck, plaintiff would have had plenty
of time to cross the intersection had he proceeded at a
reasonable speed and not at a speed of only 5 to 6 miles
per hour. As the plaintiff drove into the intersection, his
range of vision naturally became greater than the 368 feet
that he had at the stop sign. Had he been properly
observant as he drove through ~the intersection, the coal
truck would have been apparent to him at some point
prior to the collision. In this event, plaintiff needed only
to have slowed his vehicle slightly or increased his speed
in order to have avoided the collision. ·Thus, it becomes
apparent that his failure to look, or if he looked, his
failure to see was a proximate cause of the collision.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases purporting to support the proposition that the question of whether or not
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in this case was a
jury question. In none of these cases was the negligence
of the plaintiff or the causal relationship of that negligence to the injury as clearly shown as in this case. The
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collision in the case of Martin v Stevens, 243 Pac. (2d)
747, ____,__ Utah ______ , occurred at an open intersection in a
residential area where neither driver was preferred to the
other. Plaintiff in that case testified that he looked to
the east when approximately 20 feet from the intersection and saw no car in the direction from whence the
defendant came. The plaintiff proceeded into the intersection at a speed of 10 to 15 miles p·er hour where he
was struck by a car which was exceeding the speed limit.
In the case at hand, we have no evidence that the plaintiff looked as he entered the intersection. In fact, the
evidence is to the contrary. He was entering a preferred highway, and therefore had a higher degree of duty
than that in the case above cited. Moreover, he drove
through the intersection at a speed of only 5 to 6 miles
per hour.
Likewise, in the case of Poulson v MUIYI!Y/Jess, 241 Pac.
(2d) 152, ______ Utah ______ , the evidence was that plaintiff
looked in the direction from whence the defendant came
and could not see a car within 400 feet of the intersection
and was struck while crossing the intersection by a car
which was approaching, not at a rate of 35 to 50 miles
p·er hour as here, but at a rate of 70 miles per hour.
In Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d) 350, ______ Utah _____ _
plaintiff also testified that he looked before entering the
intersection, hut could see no car within 40 rods of the
intersection and was struck by a car traveling at an excessive rate of speed.
The factual situation in Hardmam v. Thurman, 2·39
Pac. ( 2d) 215, ______ Utah ______ , is not analagous to the factual
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situation in this case. In that case, Mrs. Hardman was
driving in a southerly direction on State Street in Salt
Lake Ci·ty, Utah, intending to turn east on Twenty-First
South Street. As the light turned green at Twenty-First
South Street, she stopped 1nomentarily to permi·t northbound traffic to proceed. An oil tanker which was proceeding northward in the first lane east of the center of
State Street stopped at the south line of the intersection
signalling for a left-hand turn. A car in the second lane
east of the center of State Street stopped as Mrs. HardInan started to ·turn east. Mrs. Hardman observed no
cars in the third lane to the east of the center of the
street, but as the Hardman car reached a point where it
\vould have been crossing the third lane, a trailer truck
operated by the defendant struck her automobile. The
court found that in view of the street plan at the intersection, it was not unreasonable for Mrs. Hardman not to
expect any through traffic on the third lane and she
might well have been unable to see the defendant's
vehicle because of the other cars which were stopped at
the intersection.
The case of Conklin v. Walsh, 193 Pac. (2d) 437, 113
Utah 276, involved the duties of one traveling upon an
arterial highway to observe traffic which might enter
upon that highway from intersecting highways. In that
case there was no question but that the driver of the car
entering the arterial highwaywas guilty of negligence, the
question being whether her negligence, she being the wife
of the owner of the automobile she was driving, could be
imputed to the owner.
17
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The case of Nielsen v. Mauchley, 202 Pac. (2d) 54-7,
115 Utah 68, likewise deals with the duty of one traveling
upon an arterial highway to observe other vehicles entering upon a highway, in that case from a driveway.
The same problem was involved in Hess v. Robinson,
163 Pac. ( 2d) 510, 109 Utah 60.
In Martin v. St.evens, supra, the court discussed those
cases in which the driver was held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law: Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah
501, 98 Pac. ( 2d) 350; Sine v. S1alt Lake Trarnsportation
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 Pac. (2:d) 87 5; Hickok v. Skinrner,
113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah
276, 193 Pac. (2d) 437; and Gren v. Norton, (Utah) 213
Pac. (2d) 356. Each of these cases was said to have one
principle which distinguished it from the case of Martin
v. ·stevens and the other cases cited by the plaintiff.
1

"Each of them was decided upon a proposition that the circumstances were such that the
driver held to be negligent as a matter of law,
either observed, or in the exercise of due care
should have observed, the manner in which the
other driver was approaching the intersection,
and in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable
care have avoided the collision. Or to state it in
other words, the negligence, or manner of driving
of the other driver was such that th·e driver app·raising the situation was alerted to it, or by using due care would have been so alerted in time
so that by the exercise of ordinary precaution
he could have avoided the collision. And, in each
of these cases this seemed to the court so clearly
manifest that reasonable minds could not find to
the contrary."
18
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In the case of Bullock v. Luke, supra, a motorcyclist
approaching an intersection at a speed of 25 miles per
hour, who failed to see a truck approaching the same
intersection from his left until he was within 20 feet of
the intersection, although his view was unobs~tructed for
a distance of 200 feet when 60 feet from the intersection.~
was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law
for failing to observe the truck sooner and for insisting
on his right of way after it was apparent that the truck
driver was not going to yield. The court said:
"The question may arise: When should Bullock have seen Luke to have avoided the characterization of being negligent~ In Blashfield, Vol.
2, Perm. Ed. Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, page 230, Sec. 1038, this statement is
found: "~ehere is no arbitrary rule as to the time
and place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting
road, and no particular distance from the intersection is prescribed for that purpose. The general standards are tha:t observation should be
made at the first opportunity and at a point where
observation will be reasonably efficient for, and
conduce to, protection.'
"We do not have to determine any given
point. It is sufficient if under all the circumstances we can properly say that Bullock's failure
to see Luke was, as a matter of law, negligence.
When we consider that the view west on First
s.outh was unobstructed for a distance of 200 to
800 feet, varying w~th a position from 20 to 60 feet
south or the south intersection line of Third West,
and that through all that distance, and even farther Bullock failed to see Luke, we believe reasonable' minds cannot differ as to negligence on the
part of Bullock."
19·
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In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., supra, it
was held:
''It was the duty of taxi cab operator toward
passenger on approaching intersection, to look in
both directions along intersection, and not merely
in direction from which vehicles having right of
way over him might be approaching."
And that:
"If taxi cah operator, having right of way at
intersection, saw, or in exercise of due care should
have seen, another automobile approaching at an
excessive· rate of speed or otherwise indicating
that right of way was probably not going to be
yielded to taxi cab op·erator, his duty toward passenger required him to slow down, or sjtop or
otherwise take appropriate measures to avert a
collision."
In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, supra, the collision
occurred at Twenty-F'irst South Street and West Temple
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The plaintiff was traveling
north on West Temple. Upon approaching the intersection, plaintiff came to a stop· at the stop sign located 20
feet south of the south curbline of Twenty-First South
Street. There was heavy traffic coming from the west,
so he waited for these cars to pass. He then looked east
and saw the automobile driven by the defendant more
than half a block away, between 400 and 500 feet east of
the intersection. When he started up, plaintiff figured he
had time in which to make a safe crossing before the car
coming from the east would reach the intersection. He
never again looked to the east and was struck by a car
corning from that direction when he was 18 feet south of
20
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the north curbline of Twenty-First South Street and 65
feet north of the stop sign at which he had stopped. The
trial court found the plain tiff to have been guilty of contributary negligence as a matter of law. The Supreme
Court sustained the judgment and said:

"* * * While the burden to drive so carefully
as always to be prepared for, and to be able to
avoid, the negligence of another should not be
placed on either driver, there should be placed
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither
should be permitted to close his eyes to other vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe are
approaching, simply because a state statute or
municipal ordinance designates hirn the preferred
driver. The rights of drivers approaching and
crossing intersections are relative. Both drivers
have the duties of being heedful and of maintaining a proper lookout. Plaintiff was neglectful in
both particulars, and no jury could reasonably
find he was not negligent.
"Plaintiff in claiming that, having looked once
and having concluded that he had time to clear
the intersection, he was not negligent in not having
looked again, overlooks two factors that we believe are controlling influences in this case, and
which effect the application of the rule of the Bullock case mentioned above. The first is, he was
uninformed as to the speed of defendant's car.
The second is that the speed at which plaintiff
was traveling and the distance which he had to
travel, before he entered defendant's path of
travel, permitted him to look and to re-appraise
the relative positions of the cars and pern1itted
him ample opportunity to correct his first conclu-
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sion, if he had erroneously estimated the distance
the defendant's car was from the intersection."
There is some question as to whether or not the
Hickok case was overruled in the Martin v. Stevens case,
supra. It may be that the court extended the doctrine too
far under the particular facts in the Hickok case. In that
case, plaintiff's negligence consisted in traveling 65· feet
into the intersection without ever looking to the east after
having observed an automobile approaching from that
.direction a sufficient distance away ·that the plaintiff
felt he had time to get through the intersection.
However, in the case at hand, the facts show a much
clearer picture of contributory. negligence. In this case
there is no evidence that the plaintiff looked in the direction from which the defendant came, either as he drove
the 12·5 feet into the interseetion and to the point of impact at the slow speed of 5 or 6 miles per hour or as he
entered the intersection. At least, not until it was too
late to avoid the collision.
As we have stated, the case of Conklin v. Walsh,
supra, is concerned mainly with the duty of a driver on
an arterial highway to observe a disfavored driver on an
intersecting street.
The facts in the last case, Gren v. Norton, supra, are
very similar to this case. The collision occurred at the
intersection of Fif~th West and Twelfth North Streets in
Provo, Utah. Fifth West is an arterial highway running
north and south. Traffic on Twelfth North Street is controlled by stop signs on the east and west sides of the intersection. From the intersection to the north, Fifth
2'2
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\Vest Street continues on the level for approximately
2,265 feet and then rises gradually before again leveling
out to a point approximately one mile north of the intersection.
The defendant was driving a truck south along Fifth
West Street toward the intersection. At the same time,
the decedent approached the intersection from the east
along Tvvelfth North Street. The defendant driver testified he first saw decedent's automobile as it was moving
between the stop sign and the east edge of a concrete
safety zone in the center of the intersection. At that time
the defendant was approximately 250 feet north of the
intersection. He tested his air brakes and sounded his
horn and expected the deceased to stop in the safety zone
in the center of the intersection and wait until his truck
had cleared. The decedent's car proceeded along the intersection in a straight westerly direction at a constant
rate of speed which he estimated to he between 5 and 10
miles per hour. When the defendant was about 100
feet north of the intersection, he decided that the
deceased was not going to stop and he immediately set his
brakes and sounded his horn to the point of i1npact. The
defendant testified that the deceased drove his automobile slumped down in his seat and his head straight forward and until just before the point of i1upact. That
when the deceased was about 10 feet east of the point of
collision, he appeared to look up and try to turn his autoroo bile to the left to a void a collision.
Two eye witnesses, not parties to the action, testified
decedent's car proceeded into and across the intersection
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at a slow, constant rate of sp·eed. Both observed the deceased slumped down in the seat of the car with his head
straight forward.
All witnesses to the accident or to the movement of
deceased's car immediately prior thereto, testified the
car continued across the intersection at a slow and constant rate of speed without any ap·preciable change in
speed or direction until just before the ilnpact. While
the estimated speeds varied, all witnesses described the
movements of the car as relatively slow and all were imp-ressed with the apparent lack of action on the part of
the deceased as the cars ap·proached each other.
The distance from the stop sign where the deceased
had stopped on Twelfth North Street to the point of impact was 108 feet.
The fourth District Court had entered a judgment
for the plaintiff. The Sup·reme Court held the plaintiff's
decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
and reversed the judgment. The court said:
"It is undisputed in this case that as deceased entered the intersection he had an unobstructed view of Fifth West Street to the north
for about one mile. Under the rules announced
in the cases pTeviously mentioned, he is charged
with being aware of the approach of defendant's
large trailer truck. In traversing the intersection
deceased was traveling slightly to the north of
west and by merely glancing to his right, he could
have seen all traffic which wa:s within one-half
mile of the intersection coming south on Fifth
West Street. Undoubtedly, at the time he stopped
at the stop· sign defendant's truck was some con24
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siderable distance north of the highvvay and deceased could then have reasonably concluded that
it was not close enough to constitute an immediate
hazard. His negligence, if any, was not in starting
into the intersection. If he can be charged with
negligence, as a n1atter of law, it is because of his
failure to look for approaching traffic or observe
defendant's truck after he entered into and upon
the main traveled portions of the highway and before he started across the west portion. He had
ample tin1e to make observations to the north. It is
son1e 108 feet from the place where deceased stopped to the place where the collision occurred. If
we accept the testimony most favorable to the de-·
ceased, defendant's truck was traveling at a speed
of bet\veen 50 and 55 miles per hour. This would
have figured approximately 80 feet per second,
so that it would require approximately 25 seconds
for the truck to travel the 2,200 feet which, according to the testimony is relatively level. There is
no reason why, during this whole period, the truck
could not have been observed by the deceased had
he been keeping any lookout.
"There is some contention made that the jury
could have concluded that deceased saw the approach of defendant's truck, concluded he had the
right of way and estimated that he could clear the
crossing p·rior to the time the defendant reached
the intersection, and that such estimate vvould only
; ,~~ an error in judgment and would not charge the
deceased with being guilty of negligence as a matter of law. It is further con tended in this connection that deceased is entitled to a presurnption that
he used due care for his own safety and that due
care presumes that he saw the approach of the
truck and concluded that he could pass through the
intersection in safety. These contentions might
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bear merit if the facts did not establish contrary
conclusions. The deceased had approximately 88
feet to travel fron1 the stop sign until he reached
the place where his movement might be imperiled
by traffic proceeding south along the west side
of the highway. After reaching this safety area
he would no longer be concerned with the movement of any vehicles traveling north and so he
could concentrate his attention on the movement
of traffic to the south. As he passed between
the lanes of northbound and southbound traffic,
he had app·roximately 22 feet of safe space and at
the sp·eed he was traveling he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to make observation to the
north. There was no other traffic with which h~
need concern hin1self. His actions, as testified to
by the witnesses, seemed to indicate that he had
abandoned all precautions for his own safety. He
could not have made an estimate of the distance
the defendant was from the intersection when deceased attempted to pass from the safety zone
in to the traffic lane on the west, as to the size of
the truck, its immediate proximity to the intersection, and the noise of the horn, which witnesses
claim was operating, all argue strongly against the
p·ossibility of the deceased concluding he could
pass over the west lane ahead of the truck. Moreover, unless deceased was oblivious to the approach of the truck, he would not have remained
immobile and motionless and would have taken
some action to avoid the collision. It is inconceivable that a person would see a fast-moving truck
coming down a highway, estimate he could clear
ahead of the vehicle, and yet fail to further observe its movements, fail to reapp-raise the situation, fail to increase or decrease the sp·eed of his
car or change his course of travel, or take any ac26
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tion to avoid the collision until 10 feet away from
a point of impact, particularly when there was no
necessity of observing the movement of other vehicles, when there was no obstruction of vision,
when visibility was good and when the horn of the
truck was blo,ving for at least 100 feet and the
tires were dragging for 55 feet. The physical evidence and deceased's acts and conduct were such
that any presumption of due care had been destroyed. One look to the north at any time after
deceased cleared the east lanes would have appraised a reasonably careful driver that the movement across the west lanes could not be made in
safety."
We agree \vith the statement in the opinion of Martin
v. Stevens, supra:
"No matter how far afield one may go in reviewing, analyzing and rationalizing the decisions
in these intersection cases, he 1nust always con1e
back to the one basic concept 'vhich under lies and
controls the law of torts: The conduct of the mythical but extremely useful 'ordinary reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances', all of which
is encompassed in the shorter phrase, 'due care'."
We feel that under the peculiar circumstances of
this case; that is, that the plaintiff drove 125 feet fron1
the stop sign on the south side of the highway into a busy
intersection and to the point of impact at a speed of only
5 to 6 miles per hour without looking to the east for traffic which might be approaching, after leaving the stop
south of the intersection, although he could have seen a
distance of 368 feet when he left the stop sign and could
have seen an even greater distance as he proceeded
27
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through the intersection, evidences such a lack of "due
care" on his part as to make him guilty of negligence as a
matter of law.
POINT II.
THE VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY WAS IMPROPER ON ITS FACE AND NOIT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

T'he verdict rendered in this case was as follows:
"We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants jointly and severally and
assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
"Physical injury, pain and
suffering ------------------------------------------$
Medical Expenses ----------------------------$ 214.50
Loss of earnings during
recuperation ------------------------------------$1,000.00
Permanent disability --------------------$4,000.00
Pickup truck --------------------------------------$ 565.00
Total ____________________________ ----------------$5,779 .50"
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the judge
to insert a cipher after physical injury, pain and suffering, although the record does not indicate that the judge
did so (R. 171). Plaintiff asserts that the absence of the
cipher indicates that the jury inadvertently overlooked
this item, while the insertion of the cipher indicates that
the jury concluded that the plaintiff had sustained no pain
and suffering.
We are not so clairvoyant. We believe the verdict is
so confusing as not to indicate what the jury intended
to do and is, therefore, invalid. On the face of the verdict the jury found that the plaintiff sustained no pain
28
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and suffering. Having found that he received no physical injury or pain or suffering, they could not then find
that he had suffered either any loss of injuries during
recuperation or permanent disability.
Of course, we do not contend that the plain tiff did
not receive some physical injury. In fact, at the time
of trial, we stipulated to the contrary. We do feel that
the verdict is so unresponsive to the issues and so confusing that it was invalid and cannot, therefore, be entered. Of course this point is not involved in this appeal.
Defendants are not appealing from the judgment and
believe it is correct. The point becornes important only
should this court determine to set the judgn1en t aside and
direct entry of judgment on the verdict. At that point
defendants would have a constitutional right of appeal
from that judgment. We raise the point for the court's
consideration no'v to hope that it may aid the court in
its determination and obviate the expense of further
litigation.
As to the validity of the judgment, the following is
found in 53 Am. Jur., page 729:
"In an action in which a money judgment is
sought, a verdict which fails to state specifically,
or which is indefinite as to, the amount which
the jury deems the plaintiff to be entitled to on his
cause of action, or the amount which the defendant
should recover in the event that the verdict nnds
in his favor on the counterclaim or cross-conlplaint, or a verdict which affirmatively states
that the party in whose favor the verd1et is rendered is entitled to no amount, is not one on whieh
a valid judgment can be entered. The principle
29
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just stated is applicable to the award of no1ninal
damages as well as compensatory darnag·es, sineP
this term is purely relative and carries with it no
suggestion as to amount. However, general verdicts should be construed to give them effect, if
that can be reasonably done, and it h·as been held
in a number of cases that if by reference to the
entire record in the case and all of the pleadings,
or from the data found by the jury, a definite
sum can be fixed, judgment on the verdict should
be entered for such fixed and definite amount.
Thus, for example, where the suit is up·on a pronlissory note, and the jury finds for the plaintiff,
the amount due on the note sued upon, the court in
such a case has sufficient data fron1 which the intention of the jury can be determined."
It has been held that a finding of actual damages is
a necessary predicate of punitive or exemplary damages.
See the annotations on this subject contained in 33 A.L.R.
384, and 81' .A...L.R. 913, wherein the general rule is stated
to be:
"* * * That actual damages must be found as
a p·redicate for-or, as sometimes expressed, actual damage must have been done to sustainan award of exemplary damages, is the rule to
which most of the courts are committed.''
S.ee also the cases collected in 116 .A...L.R. 828, wherein the following general rule is announced:
"In an action in which a money judgment is
sought, a verdict which fails to state specifically,
or which is indefinite as so, the amount to which
the jury deems the plaintiff to he entitled on his
cause of action, or the amount wh"ich the defendant should recover in the event that the verdict
finds in his favor on his counterclaim or cross30
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complaint, or a verdict which affirmatively states
that the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered is entitled to no amount, is not one on which
a valid judgment can be entered."
In 20 A.L.R. (2) 276, will be found a collection of
cases which hold that a verdict which awards the plaintiff the a1nount of his medical expenses vvithout simultaneously awarding him dan1ages for pain and suffering
is invalid. Therein vvrill be found this statement:
"The question discussed in this annotation
is whether a verdict may validly award plaintiff,
in a personal injury action, the exact amount of his
medical expenses \vithout sin1ultaneously awarding hin1 dan1ages for pain and suffering where
claim therefor was made and properly proven.
"Th·e nu1nber of cases in which this question
has been specifically answered is relatively small.
But despite the dearth of authority, it seems permissible to state, on general principles,, that such
a verdict is invalid, and all the cases in which this
particular point was involved are in accord with
this rule."
The foregoing citation was cited in Hall v. Cornet,
(Ore.) 240 Pac. ( 2d) 231. In that case, plaintiff brought
an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile
collision which allegedly resulted fro1n the negligence
of the defendant. The first verdict of the jury awarded
the plaintiff $1.00 general damages and $1,066.40 special
damages. The jury was instructed and sent back for
further consideration. The jury then returned a verdict
awarding $300.00 general damages and $707.40 special
damages. The court then set aside the verdict and grant31
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ed plaintiff a new trial. The Supreme Court sustained
the trial judge and said:
"A verdict cannot validly award plaintiff
in action for personal injuries allegedly caused
through defendant's negligence, exact amount of
his medical expenses without simultaneously
awarding him damages for pain and sufferingwh'en claim therefor was properly made and
proven.''
The court sustained the granting of a new trial in
that case under the following reasoning:
"In returning that verdict, (the second verdict) the jury was guilty of misconduct. The record conclusively shows they merely juggled the
figures which they had adopted in their first abortive verdict. They simply borrowed $299.00 from
the undisputed amount of the special dan1ages,
as first found by them, and added that sum to the
$1.00 which they had previously attempted to
award as. general damages, with a resultant verdict of $300.00 general damages and $707.40 special damages. They gave no genuine consideration
to the instruction of the trial court to award the.
plain tiff, in the event they found liability, such
'sum of money as would reasonably compensate
her for such injuries and damages, pain and suffering.'"
In the case of Haydel v. Morton, 48 Pac. (2d) 709,
(Cal.) in was held that a verdict for plaintiff in a slander
suit which assessed compensatory damages in the sum
of $0.00 and exemplary damages at $10,000.00 required a
new trial.
One might argue that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of th·e jury to find any damages for
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physical injury, pain and suffering. Such an argument
overlooks the fact that the verdict shows on its face
that the jury were guilty of misconduct in failing to follow
the instruction of the court in assessing damages or that
the instructions of the court were confusing or n1isleading. It presumes that if the jury had followed the instructions of the court, or the instructions had not been misleading, the jury would have returned exactly the same
verdict except that they would have made an award for
physical injury, pain and suffering. Such a presumption
is not warranted.
The Court in its Instruction No. 1 R. 212-213, in reviewing the claims of the plaintiff, instructed the jury
that the action had been brought by the plaintiff to recover for injuries and damage including the following.
"A hemorrhage of the mouth, a brain injury,
from which he has suffered partial loss of function
of his right hand and arm and from which, such
right hand and ar1n are still partially paralyzed,
continuous accute headaches, impaired vision and
accute pain and suffering. That such injuries to
his brain are continuing and progressive and will
require that plaintiff undergo surgical care and
treatment . . . that in addition thereto plaintiff
has been caused to incur medical expenses which
amounted to $2'14.50 ... which plaintiff contemplated would increase $2,000.00 ... and he alleges
... he was a healthy and able bodied man and was
capable of earning $700.00 per month, because of
the accident he was unable to work at all for four
months from which fact he suffered damages in
the su~ of $2,800.00, he has suffered continuing
impairment and disability so that he suffered a
loss of earning power in the sum of $56,000.00,".
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These instructions were excepted to (R. 160) upon
the grounds that there was no evidence to substantiate
any of these claims except the item of $214.50 medical
exp.enses and that these issues should not be presented
to the jury even in the form given in Instruction No. 1
as such would tend to ·mislead and confuse the jury. The
court repeated this error in Instruction 1'5. T'hat they
were misleading and did confuse the jury is evidenced
by the execessive award given for p-er1nanent injuries in
this case.
On the question of loss and earnings, the only evidence was that Mr. Bates lost 200 turkeys after this accident during the year 19-52. However, he was only able
to guess at this amount after the continual prodding of
his attorney, his first answer being that he had no idea.
He then testified that it was normal to lose more turkeys at this time of the year than at any other time of the
year and that most of thes.e losses were normal, so that
it is impossible to determine from the evidence in this
case if Mr. Bates lost any turkeys as a result of this accident, if he did, how many, and the value of those lost.
Of course, the following year, Mr. Bates netted $8,212.35
as compared with $2,000.00 in the year 1952, so that if
any conclusion can be drawn the only conclusion warranted is that the accident was responsible for him making more rather than less on the op·eration of his turkey
farm.
On the question of permanent disability, there was
no ·evidence of any permanent disability other than the
fact that the plaintiff, a sixty-nine year old man, was
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forgetful after the accident and that he could not do the
work after the accident that he could before although he
admitted he could not do heavy work before the accident.
It is submitted, therefore, that the verdict was invalid and judgment cannot be entered thereon, and that
the defendant would be prejudicially affected by its
entry.
C·ONCLUSION
In conclusion we can summarize the evidence and the
reasons why plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence no better than the trial judge in his memorandum
decision herein starting on page 174 of the record:
"·The plaintiff testified that he was driving
his truck from his turkey ranch northward on the
Geneva Road on Oetober 9, 1952, and at about two
o'clock P.M. came to the intersection of that road
with Highway 91 at Pleasant Grove, where he
stopped at the stop sign. The weather was clear
and the pavement was dry. That the traffic was
quite heavy, compelling him to wait four or five
minutes before the intersection cleared sufficiently for him to attempt to cross. That he was driving a 19'41 truck in low and was going 5 to 6 miles
per hour. He was well acquainted with this intersection, knew it was a very busy way and had had
to wait at times for as much as fifteen minutes for
traffic to clear. That he saw the coal truck co1ning
when it was 'maybe 150 feet away and coming
fast' and 'did speed up a little right on the last'
and got 'pret' near across but got hit.' He estimated the point of impact and upon his estimate
it was measured upon plaintiff's exhibit 'A' at
12'5' from the stop sign where he had stopped.
Upon cross examination he testified that he did

35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not see one Dr. Paul Christopherson who was
traveling east upon Highway 91 and turned south
upon the Geneva R.oad past him. Neither did he
see Dr. Christop·erson's salutation even though
he did see a car approaching. He couldn't tell how
far the truck was away when he saw it, hut estimated that it was between 100' and 150 away. He
did speed up a little, saw the truck approaching
just before the impact. The testimony now is that
he saw the truck but doesn't know exactly how far
away it was. He did not remember John Stewart,
an insurance adjuster. Nor did he remen1ber
. giving him the statement, Defendants' Exhibit
1, or that he made the state1nent therein contained,
to-wit:
" 'I was about three-fourths of the way across
the highway (two lanes) when I was hit by the
truck or know it was near until it hit me.'
"To this statement he wrote in his own hand:
" 'I have read pages one, two, three and they
are correct. Leonard Bates.' and he acknowledges
that the signatures upon each page of the state-~
ment are his own.
''He drove in a straight line from the stop
sign the 125· feet plus or minus to the point of
impact, making no attempt whatsoever to turn
his truck to the left. Considering this evidence
in its most favorable light for the plaintiff as the
court must do up·on a motion of the sort under consideration, there is still no escap·e from the conclusion that after the plaintiff had p-rudently stopped
-at the stop sign, and had prudently waited for
some 5 or 6 minutes for traffic to clear, and prudently started into the intersection after it had become clear, he did not look again in either direction, at ·any rate until he had crossed the center
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line of Highway 91 going northerly. Furthermore,
it is inescapable that he continued his truck in low
gear for a distance in excess of 100 feet traveling
through an intersection which he knew to be so
busy that he had had to wait as much as fifteen
minutes on previous occasions for traffic to clear,
at a speed of 5 or 6 miles per hour while he stated
he could have traveled faster, (he said that he
did speed up a little when he saw the truck coming at him pretty fast) and if he had traveled
faster by any appreciable degree he would have
cleared the intersection before defendants' truck
came within a dangerous distance.
"As shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 'A', a line
drawn from the stop sign easterly past the first
obstruction to visibility, gave him an unobstructed
vie\v up the highway for 268 feet. Manifestly
as he advanced into the intersection, his view extended to his right (as well as to his left). If he
had kept a reasonable and proper lookout he could
have seen defendants' truck for a great distance
along the highway (considering that he was
traveling as slowly as the evidence indicates and
the defendant was traveling between 35 and 50
miles per hour). Even if he had seen it was 268;
feet away, he would still have h'ad plenty of time
to speed up and pass in head of it or stop safely
on the south side of the center line (even though
ever so negligent) to pass safely in head of him.
"If he had looked as the law required him to
do, he would have· seen, and if he had seen he
could have avoided the collision by the simple
expedient of stopping, turning aside or even by
speeding up.
"In his failure, he was negligent as a matter
of law and likewise, as a matter of law, his negli37
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gence proximately contributed to produce the accident and his own injury and damage. Generally,
the authorities for this determination are so farniliar to both counsel that to quote them would be
mere surplusage, except the court especially draws
attention to the language of Martin v. Stevens,
243 Pac. (2d) 747, under syllabus No. 7, where
the court describing the duties of the driver with
the right of way at an intersection says: 'Admittedly the right of way is not absolute. One who
has it under one or both of the aforen1entioned
rules, (entering the intersection upon his right
of way because he entered first, when to do so
would hazard a collision and that giving right of
way to the right hand of two vehicles entering the
intersection at the same time). may not, with foolhardy assurance, claim the right of way in face of
danger which one exercising due care would see
and avoid. Although plaintiff (as here) had the
right of way under both rules above referred to,
yet there .dev-eloped upon him the duty of d'ue ca.re
in observmg for other traffic. But in doing so, he.
had the right to assume, amd to rely a(Ji;,d act on
the ~assumption that others would do likewise; he
was not obli.qate:dl to an.ticip~ate either that the
other W'Ould drive negligently, nor fail to accord
him his right of way, until in the exercise of due
care, he observed., or should have observed, some-thing to warn him that the other driver w·as driving negligently or would fail to accord him his
right of way.' " (Italics. added.)
The entry of the verdict in this case was erroneous.
Not for the reasons set forth by the plaintiff. The reasons
being that a finding of p-ermanent damage and loss of
earnings during recuperation must be predicated upon
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a finding of physical injury, pain and suffering. And for
the additional reason that the evidence does not sustain
the amount awarded for loss of earnings or permanent
disability and these issues should not have been submitted to the jury. Of course, this point is immaterial should
this court determine that the trial judge was correct in
the granting of the motion to set aside the verdict. It
becomes important only if the court should reverse the
trial judge, in which event, it is respectfully submitted,
this court would have no alternative but to grant a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
STE:WART, CANNON & HAN'S'ON
D·ON J. HANSO·N
Attorneys for Defe~Wdoots arnd
Respondents

520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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